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Abstract 
 
As a social science, economics studies social interactions. What distinguishes it from 
other social science disciplines is, firstly, its focus on interactions involving the 
management of scarce resources and, secondly, its conception of itself as generating 
traceable, verifiable findings that are free of normative judgements but instead yield 
‘objective knowledge’. Some regard this methodological foundation of positivist 
fallibilism as the feature that makes economics the ‘queen of the social sciences’. Others 
are critical of these core assumptions, which they believe have no place in a social science. 
Interestingly, both critiques and defences of economics often make reference to ideology: 
defenders claim that economics is as free of ideological bias as it is possible to be, while 
critics deny economics’ status as a science and instead regard it as an ‘ideology that serves 
to uphold power relations’.  
This article explores the relationship between ideology and economics with special 
reference to German academia, and asks whether a pluralist approach to economics could 
help to make the discipline less vulnerable to the charge of being ideological. 
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1. Introduction 
Economics is a social science, which means that it studies social interactions, just like 
disciplines such as sociology and political science. What distinguishes it from these other 
disciplines is, firstly, its focus on interactions involving the management of scarce 
resources and, secondly, the fact that the overwhelming majority of academic economists 
understand themselves to be generating traceable, verifiable findings that are free of 
normative judgements and individual or group/class-specific perspectives but instead 
yield ‘objective knowledge’, whereby only propositions that are deduced in a logically 
correct manner and cannot be empirically falsified are accepted (see e.g. Drakopoulos 
1997). Some regard this methodological foundation of positivist fallibilism as the feature 
that makes economics the ‘queen of the social sciences’ (see e.g. Badinger, Oberhofer 
and Cuaresma 2017) because it appears to guarantee an objectivity and value freedom 
analogous to the natural sciences. Others (such as Beschorner 2017) are critical of core 
assumptions that they believe have no place in a social science, such as the oft-criticised 
notion of the homo economicus. 
Interestingly, both critiques and defences of economics often make reference to ideology: 
defenders claim that economics is as free of ideological bias as it is possible to be, while 
critics deny economics’ status as a science and instead regard it as an ‘ideology that serves 
to uphold power relations’ (Girscher 2012: 1; own translation). How did these apparently 
contradictory positions come about? Is it due to the ambivalent use of the term ‘ideology’ 
or, as Joan Robinson believes, the fact that  
economics has always been partly a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each 
period as well as partly a method of scientific investigation. (Robinson 
1962: 1)  
This article will explore the relationship between ideology and economics, in line with 
the task formulated by Robinson:  
To sort out as best we may this mixture of ideology and science. (Robinson 
1962: 25)  
Special reference is given to German academic economics that is sometimes portrayed as 
particularly stiff-necked in its alliance with market apologetics (see e.g. Bachmann 2015). 
Moreover, one particular focus will be to consider whether a pluralist approach to 
economics, something for which there are growing calls (see e.g. Dobusch/Kapeller 2012; 
Heise 2017a; Heise 2018; Haucap and Erlei 2019: 405; Beckenbach 2019), could help to 
make the discipline less vulnerable to the charge of being ideological. 
2. DSGE as standard economics  
Like all sciences, economics has a long history of theoretical and methodological 
development. The discipline’s theoretical development is documented in numerous 
works on the history of economic thought, while its methodological development 
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includes the two Methodenstreite (‘method disputes’) of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. These disputes concerned economics’ conception of itself as a 
scientific discipline, something that is important for the internal consolidation of a 
epistemic community so that it does not have to constantly debate what can and cannot 
be accepted as a scientifically validated result. In Lakatosian terms, what was at stake in 
these disputes was economics’ methodological dimension as a quality control criterion. 
Positivist fallibilism prevailed over historico-empirical and normative-evaluative 
methodologies inasmuch as proponents of the latter approaches left (or were forced to 
leave) economics as a discipline and instead flocked to the sociological institutions that 
were also expanding at that time.1 Inspired by the natural sciences (especially physics), 
there was a clear ambition to create a science capable of producing generally accepted 
findings (i.e. ‘objective knowledge’) on the basis of ‘methodological monism’.2 In line 
with the Kuhnian theory of science, it is considered a sign of a science’s maturity when, 
after a period of competition between different theoretical approaches, it arrives at a 
monistic paradigm that can lay sole claim to being the ‘objective truth’ and ward off any 
relativism that would undermine this claim.  
With the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, a paradigm (in Kuhnian 
terminology), scientific research programme (in Lakatosian terminology) or Denkstil 
(‘thought style’, in Fleckian terminology) was established that can indisputably be 
considered ‘market-oriented’ and ‘market-friendly’. It is ‘market-oriented’ because it 
takes exchange processes that typically occur on markets as its ontological basis. 
Decision and action situations under conditions of scarcity are modelled in terms of 
intertemporal exchange relations. This is done on the basis of certain core 
epistemological assumptions (‘axioms’) such as the rationality, substitution and ergodic 
axioms, which – supplemented by a ‘protective belt’ of microeconomic assumptions 
including rational expectation formation, infinitesimal rates of price and quantity 
adjustment, conditions of perfect competition and the absence of transaction costs (the 
essential features of ‘perfect markets’) and the macroeconomic condition of Walras’s 
law – describe a state of general equilibrium. As used here in the sense of ‘market 
clearing’ and ‘balance of supply and demand’, equilibrium can, to be sure, be 
understood as having positive connotations, since it describes a state in which market 
actors do not want anything to change. Precisely where the equilibrium state is situated 
will depend on many subjective factors (preferences, inclinations, utility calculations, 
etc.), and although attempts to strip away this subjective element to yield a purely 
                                                          
1 Of course, sociology differs from economics not just methodologically, but also in terms of its subject 
matter (economics: human–object relations, sociology: human–human relations) and epistemological 
basis (economics: logical explanation of logical action, sociology: logical explanation of non-logical 
action); cf. Mikl-Horke 2008: 25).  
2 This refers both to uniformity of methodology (not of methods!) within economics and across its 
various epistemological approaches, and between the natural and social sciences.  
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objective analysis have been unsuccessful (cf. Drakopoulos 1997: 11ff.), the subjectivity 
is confined to the model’s ‘data’ and does not extend to the methodology of the inquiry 
itself.3 
All other paradigms, scientific research programmes or Denkstile, such as Marxian 
theories, the various post-Keynesianisms, behavioural economics, complexity 
economics, evolutionary economics, feminist economics and the Austrian School,4 have 
been either increasingly marginalised or form a tolerated ‘cutting edge’, which according 
to some commentators is where the truly interesting work within the dominant DSGE 
paradigm is being done (cf. Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004: 486ff.). The status of a 
paradigm – tolerated or marginalised – depends crucially on whether it shares the 
ontological, market-oriented and market-friendly core of the DSGE paradigm as a 
heuristic or at least does not aggressively challenge it (‘dissenters’ are tolerated) or 
openly reject it (‘heterodox’ approaches are marginalised).5  
3. On the concept of ideology 
Before turning to the question of the extent to which economics, in the form of the 
dominant research programme with its aspiration to the status of a science, is or is not 
ideological, the concept of ‘ideology’ must be briefly clarified. The sociologist Karl 
Mannheim (1954) distinguishes between a value-free and an evaluative concept of 
ideology. The value-free conception understands ideology as a vision of a desired (i.e. 
positively construed) state. It is thus value-free not in the sense that it does not involve 
subjective assessments, but in that it is a neutral descriptor of a ‘worldview’ that serves 
as a necessary guide to social action. The evaluative concept of ideology, by contrast, 
refers to an interpretation of reality that, in the service of particular interests, consciously 
or unconsciously conceals certain facts or makes untrue/unverifiable claims. 
In this article, I shall be using this negatively connoted concept of ideology. Accordingly, 
to call economics ideological is to imply that it, consciously or unconsciously, ‘sells’ 
untruths as truths so as to promote individual or group/class-specific interests.  
But why should economics accept this charge of ideological distortion, if its 
methodological apparatus is geared precisely towards producing maximally objective 
                                                          
3 Following Hans Albert (1965: 189), Viktor Vanberg (2019: 435) distinguishes between ‘problems 
of value basis’ (e.g. the selection of assumptions), ‘problems of value judgements in the area of 
investigation’ (e.g. the selection of questions considered relevant) and ‘problems of value judgement 
proper’ (e.g. value judgements in the assertions or propositions drawn from the findings); only 
problems of the first two categories are conceded, not the latter. 
4 A recent special issue of List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik attempted to survey the full 
breadth of different research programmes and compare them with the mainstream: see Haucap and 
Erlei 2019.  
5 Keynesianism, which in the form of neo-Keynesianism belongs to the DSGE paradigm and in the 
form of post-Keynesianism is heterodox, is one example of a paradigm with both heterodox and 
orthodox variants; others include complexity economics, which can likewise be divided into tolerated 
orthodox and marginalised heterodox research programmes (see Heise 2017b).  
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‘truths’ (i.e. traceable, verifiable findings)? One common argument points to the supposed 
autism of the theoretical framework, which does not allow any meaningful reference to 
reality. This criticism thus takes aim at the lack of social context in the often highly formal 
economic models, and questions the realism of the core axioms, especially the rationality 
assumption. Critics also argue that the underlying conception of homo economicus 
reduces human beings to ‘calculating machines’ and represses social ties and motivations 
in favour of a fully economically rational way of acting, thereby covertly smuggling in 
normative aspects. Finally, the way that the state of general equilibrium is treated as an 
‘ideal’ or ‘model’ solution is criticised for constructing a ‘Nirvana model’, from which 
(predominantly ‘laissez-faire’) economic policy conclusions are derived that are adopted 
uncritically and in extreme form into general conceptions (‘supply-side policies’ with a 
primary focus on allocation). According to the critics,6 the ideological nature of 
economics thus construed consists in its giving a description of reality that, in virtue of 
its abstractness and tendency to prefer a particular market solution (equilibrium), must be 
considered ‘untrue’ and ultimately only serves the interests of those who profit from 
uncorrected market outcomes. 
4. DSGE and ideology 
When assessing these interpretations of economics in its current form (i.e. the DSGE 
paradigm as ‘normal science’ that claims monistic authority) as an ideological product, 
we should distinguish between criticism of the paradigm itself and criticism of the way 
economists operate with it. In response to criticisms of the paradigm, it can always be 
conceded that of course each individual assumption, whether in the core or the protective 
belt, can and, in the spirit of critical scrutiny, indeed must be questioned. This happens 
constantly in scientific practice,7 and is the source of the myriad variations within the 
DSGE paradigm, which have given rise not just to the two fundamental strands of 
standard and new Keynesianism on the one hand and new classical macroeconomics on 
the other, which differ primarily in the assumptions in the protective belt, but also to 
extensions of the Denkstil such as experimental, behavioural and complexity economics, 
which take a critical view even of the core axioms, though without questioning the DSGE 
heuristic.8 These extensions diverge sufficiently that it is possible to derive alternative 
economic policy conceptions from them, such as supply- or demand-side policies. We do 
                                                          
6 See for example Wilber and Wisman (1975: 672), who speak of an ideal type that ‘is treated as if it 
were a highly confirmed theory of “what is”’. 
7 This should not lead us to assume that the main occupation of ‘standard economists’ consists in 
critically scrutinising their own paradigm; rather, it involves ‘uncritically’ extending this paradigm to 
more and more areas of application. But of course science comprises both these aspects: constant 
critical scrutiny on the one hand and uncritical application as per the Kuhnian notion of normal science 
on the other.  
8 In the aforementioned special issue of List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, for instance, 
the author of the article on behavioural economics writes in his conclusion that ‘modern behavioural 
economics is not an alternative programme to standard economics. Although it rejects one of the core 
axioms of standard economics by objecting that humans are not perfectly rational, it can be considered 
an integral part of standard economics.’ (Dittrich 2018: 852; own translation). 
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not have to agree with Hans-Werner Sinn (2014; own translation), who claims that 
‘economists (like tracking dogs) scour the economy looking for flaws and consider how 
to rectify them by means of smart state interventions’, to concede that this is possible 
within the framework of the DSGE paradigm, and indeed is often done in practice. Thus, 
the market fundamentalism often disparaged as ‘ideological’ is not a feature of the DSGE 
paradigm per se, but can at most be imputed to certain variants and to those proponents 
who, at least in the policies they derive from the theory, tend to attribute considerable 
real-world efficacy to the self-regulatory mechanism of ‘perfect markets’.  
Another possible criticism is that the entire approach of economics is misguided because 
human behaviour simply cannot be represented in the deterministic terms of the natural 
sciences and any attempt to do so will necessarily result in flawed judgements and 
ideological assertions rather than objective knowledge. However, frequent discussions of 
this topic have yielded little in the way of results (in the sense of objective knowledge as 
opposed to ideological distortion; see Adorno 1962; Popper 1962; Keuth 1989). By 
contrast with economic sociology, economics aspires to produce generally valid 
‘explanations’, not merely to offer contextualised ‘understanding’. Whether it is actually 
possible to satisfy this ambition within the framework of ‘positivist fallibilism’ depends 
on conditions that we shall turn to shortly. In any case, the fact that economics relies on 
model-theoretic abstractions that necessarily make little reference to reality is by itself 
not enough to ground a charge of ideology.  
What really matters is how economists operate with DSGE models. We shall consider, 
firstly, the history of DSGE’s rise to the status of dominant paradigm, and, secondly, the 
prevalence of DSGE modelling in actual educational and political practice. 
5. From interwar pluralism to DSGE monism 
In most highly developed economies, including Germany, economics was not always 
dominated by the DSGE model. In line with the Kuhnian theory, during the interwar 
period, and also later on in the 1960s and 70s, there was a wide array of different, 
competing theories, which were represented at universities by the holders of professorial 
posts. Until the end of World War II, many of the economics professors at German 
universities were proponents of the ‘historical school’, but there were also some Marxist 
professors (at least until the 1930s). Only in the course of the ‘self-Americanisation’ of 
German academic economics post-1945 (cf. Hesse 2010: 320ff.) did economics 
professors come to be increasingly recruited from proponents of DSGE modelling, in the 
form of the then-dominant standard Keynesianism; as with the later restructuring of 
economics in accordance with ‘international standards’, this was an expression of a desire 
to satisfy externally defined ‘quality criteria’. This narrowing of the paradigmatic 
composition of the community of academic economists that had grown so dramatically 
over the years was interrupted by a brief phase of repluralisation in the 1960s and 70s, 
when, in the wake of the student protests and widespread social reforms, more heterodox 
staff were appointed, especially at the newly founded universities, with the explicit aim 
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of providing an alternative to the standard economics that was only just beginning to 
consolidate. However, this pluralisation was very limited in quantitative terms and 
confined to only certain institutions, and gained no purchase in the wider economics 
community, as evidenced in the dearth of appointments of heterodox economists working 
in the post-Keynesian or Marxian traditions at the older, traditional universities (see 
Heise, Sander and Thieme 2017). 
The marginalisation of heterodox economics that could be observed in the subsequent 
three decades and the simultaneous paradigmatic narrowing at German universities9 
conflicts with the myth of the perfect ‘market of economic ideas’ in which the ‘best ideas’ 
(i.e. those with the greatest empirically supported explanatory power) win out, and instead 
suggests a flawed, unregulated scientific market. The ‘market of economic ideas’ has a 
number of notable features: the commodity of ‘scientific knowledge’ is an (international) 
public good whose value depends on trust and confidence. What matters on this market 
is not price-based supply and demand structures, but the reputation of providers. To 
ensure quality control, the market generally has excess supply (to ensure a ‘selection of 
the best’). High levels of investment in extremely specific human capital and the 
associated sunk cost give rise to a demand for standardisation in order to reduce systemic 
risks. Thanks to path dependences, lock-in effects or what Ludwik Fleck termed 
stilgemäße Denkzwänge (‘thought compulsion’), this standardisation demand is met by a 
standardisation supply in the form of various paradigms, economic research programmes 
or Denkstile. Which of them is ultimately able to win out and thus transmute the 
ontological pluralism (i.e. the variety of ‘pre-analytic visions’ concerning the essence of 
the object of investigation) into a monism depends on the providers’ economic, social and 
cultural capital.10 It is highly plausible that the reason why it was a handful of private elite 
universities belonging to the USA’s scientific hegemony that were able to elevate their 
Denkstil to universally valid status, and one of the reasons why its positing of social 
exchange as the basic ontological constituent of economic interactions is not seriously 
questioned, is that a more market-critical ontology would not have been able to flourish 
in the market-oriented US American culture,11 and, just as importantly, that markets and 
exchange are always presupposed as the basic forms of economic interaction: a ‘state of 
                                                          
9 Grimm et al. (2017) estimate that at present over 90% of professors at German-speaking universities 
use mainstream research approaches. 
10 Institutional incentives such as rankings or third-party funding potential can be used as supposedly 
objective quality criteria in order to consolidate a paradigmatic standard; see for example Lee 
(2007); Lee, Pham and Gu (2013).  
11 Nor is this idea contradicted by the fact that a theoretical school that is now generally regarded as a 
heterodox paradigm, namely American institutional economics, was dominant in US universities in 
the late nineteenth century. This is firstly because this was during the ‘preparadigmatic’ era of 
economics’ development as a discipline, during which no paradigm had yet achieved hegemonic 
status. The influence of market orientation only (later) made itself felt when American universities 
moved away from the German Humboldtian model (see esp. Veblen 1918; see also e.g. Diehl 1978, 
Herbst 1965). Secondly, it is by no means obvious that American institutionalism is incompatible with 
a market-oriented culture.  
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nature’ or Kantian a priori analytic judgement (see Aspers 2015: 75–76). 
The practice of economics on the basis of methodological and ontological monism is, 
thus, not the result of fair competition over the best process of inquiry, but rather of a 
process of standardisation that, like all such processes, can stand in the way of better 
outcomes (see for instance Arthur 1989). In the case of economics, a better outcome 
would not be, say, establishing another paradigm as a monistic standard, but rather 
accepting the pluralist imperative that applies to the social sciences (see Heise 2017a). 
Positing a pre-analytic vision becomes ideological if alternative ontologies, such as a 
Marxian power-based or post-Keynesian obligation-based ontology, are discriminated 
against; and this is true regardless of whether this discrimination is deliberate or a result 
of ignorance. 
6. Textbook DSGE and ideology 
The practice of a science also includes, of course, passing on knowledge to the next 
generation of scholars. A value-free, unideological approach here would require teaching 
future economists about the theoretical foundations of their discipline at the earliest 
possible stage in their education. Furthermore, true to the didactic principle that students 
should not be indoctrinated, it should be an explicit aim of educational practice to either 
teach about the plurality of existing paradigms or make clear the one-sidedness of the 
approach that is being used. Thus, a class on ‘neoclassical economics’12 or a textbook on 
post-Keynesianism would definitely be permissible, but a course on the foundations of 
economics based solely on a textbook that describes just one paradigmatic approach 
would have to be rejected as value-laden and hence ideological. An increasing number of 
studies13 on the content of curricula and choice/content of textbooks suggests that this is 
the case for the vast majority of economics teaching at German universities: although 
there exist plenty of textbooks with a pluralist approach,14 almost all institutions 
exclusively use the US American textbooks that dominate the market (or their German 
translations), all of which not only relay a decidedly neoclassical approach but also fail 
to situate this approach within the landscape of different theories, and refer only to 
developments or refinements within the same paradigm or Denkstil; they do not cite any 
heterodox literature. The approach taken by Blanchard and Illing (2015), the most-used 
textbook in German university seminars, can serve as an example. Macroeconomic 
disputes are explained in terms of Keynesian and classical variants of the DSGE 
paradigm, or by reference to the distinction between the short run (involving temporary 
                                                          
12 For instance, the University of Notre Dame’s Department of Economics, following an organisational 
split that saw its heterodox economists hived off into a separate Department of Economics and Policy 
Studies after decades of coexistence, for a while explicitly referred to itself as ‘neoclassical’.  
13 See for example Peukert 2018a; Peukert 2018b, Graupe 2017; Beckenbach et al. 2016; Hedtke 2016; 
van Treeck and Urban 2016.  
14 A few examples of such textbooks: for general economics, Heine and Herr (2012); for economic 
policy, Heise (2010); for microeconomics, Biesecker and Kesting (2003) or Elsner, Heinrich and 
Schwardt (2015); for growth theory, Hein (2004); and for monetary theory, Ehnts (2016).  
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disequilibriums and states of market failure, where state interventions would make sense) 
and the middle/long run (where the ‘natural’ equilibrium states are reached and state 
interventions would be ineffective/unnecessary). Moreover, the distinction between short 
and medium/long run economics, which differ in terms of their economic policy focus 
but share the common assumption that the ‘market economy’ will regulate itself over the 
long term, was until the fourth edition explicitly described as representing ‘common 
beliefs’ about which ‘most macroeconomists are in agreement’ (Blanchard and Illing 
2006: 796) and ‘propositions accepted by virtually all macroeconomists’ (Blanchard and 
Illing 2006: 796). No more is said about the other macroeconomists who disagree, nor is 
there any critical theoretical reflection on the monism manifested in these statements. 
Interestingly, in the fifth edition (published after the financial crisis) this section of the 
textbook was rewritten and replaced by ‘First lessons from the financial crisis’, though 
the conclusions it drew from it are conservative in scope: the ‘common beliefs’ are 
fundamentally sound, but are only applicable to normal economic situations. Exceptional 
situations, like the recent global economic crisis, cast the fundamental self-regulation 
postulate in a more critical light: more research is needed, the authors suggest, though 
presumably not a scientific revolution (Blanchard and Illing 2015: 731). The, possibly 
unconscious, ideological bias in this view is evident from the fact that the instability of 
the ‘market economy’ is attributed to the ‘exceptional nature’ of the situation; whatever 
does not fit within the explanatory framework of the paradigm is explained away as an 
‘exception’.  
Thus, any attempt to claim economics education in Germany is value-free must itself be 
regarded as an ideological distortion by groups or individuals misinterpreting reality to 
suit their own interests. 
7. Policy consulting and ideology 
One especially difficult question concerns the relationship between academia and politics. 
Politics involves setting and pursuing social goals, guided by values; it is thus pure 
ideology, at least in the positively connoted sense of the term. But the use of false 
interpretations of reality to serve one’s agenda is also part of the day-to-day business of 
politics, with policy consultants being brought on board to help provide legitimacy. How 
can economists working in this field defend their claim to objectivity, or does science 
always become ideological when put to the service of politics? 
To answer this question, it is again necessary to draw a distinction between, on the one 
hand, the relationship between academia and politics and, on the other, the way in which 
the policy consulting is practised. A scientific paradigm cannot help being appropriated 
by political ideologies, just as Marxian economics, the neoclassical Austrian School and 
standard Keynesianism were respectively used to legitimise communism (see e.g. Ollman 
1977), neoliberalism (see e.g. Ötsch 2009) and classical post-war social democracy (see 
e.g. Przeworski 1985). And of course proposals at the policy/polity level can be derived 
from scientific paradigms in order to achieve predefined goals (such as the ‘magic square 
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of economic policy’ or distribution/efficiency targets) or to identify and resolve conflicts 
between goals. Economic policy is thus, just like every other area of politics, ideological, 
whereas economic policy action programmes and their scientific foundations are 
administrative. Matters become ideological if the competition between action 
programmes based on the imperative of pluralist economics is suppressed by means of 
the TINA prerogative – but it is politicians, not academics, who are guilty of this 
ideological distortion. 
Kirchgässner (2013: 202) breaks down the actual process of policy consulting (in 
Germany) into five different categories, the two which most concern us here being 
proposals addressed to the general public and reports commissioned by political actors or 
interest groups. If an economist pursues their discipline not just as a purely intellectual 
challenge or in the spirit of ‘l’art pour l’art’, they will eventually take some sort of stance 
on economic policy questions. Their choice of epistemological and ontological frame of 
reference will be guided either by what they expect will attract the greatest acceptance 
among colleagues or from the commissioner of their reports or by what they believe will 
most likely yield the best explanation of, and possibly solution to, the problems or 
phenomena under investigation (the Lakatosian progressiveness criterion). Paid reports 
are, without a doubt, the most likely to be ideological, since the rationality of obtaining 
commissions is at odds with the principle of scientific objectivity. However, not every 
paid report will necessarily be biased, if the report writer’s allegiance to a certain 
paradigm is known at the time of the commission. In that case, the consultant can abide 
by the usual scientific criteria enshrined in codes of ethics15 while simultaneously meeting 
the commissioner’s expectations; however, this presupposes the plurality of economics, 
a norm that is upheld in reality to only a very limited extent. 
If the choice of paradigm is based on the criterion of achieving maximum acceptance in 
the scientific community or on the progressiveness criterion, this does not necessarily 
prevent flawed advice, but it does counter the charge of ideology, at least if a paradigm 
pluralism allows competing advice to be given and it is an explicit condition of the 
commission that the paradigmatic basis of this advice be made transparent.16 The 
(almost17) inevitable relativism may be unamenable to politicians in an ideal world in 
which politics is solely committed to upholding the common good. In the more realistic 
conception of a world of plural interests, however, pluralist policy consulting allows even 
non-dominant interests to receive scientific support.18 This runs counter to the suggestion 
                                                          
15 The German Economic Association’s code of ethics, for instance, can be found at 
<www.socialpolitik.de/DE/ethikkodex>. 
16 Article 2 of the German Act on the Appointment of a Council of Experts on Economic Development 
can be interpreted in precisely this sense.  
17 Different interpretations of reality need not necessarily result in different economic intervention 
proposals; for instance, it is often hard to distinguish the economic policy approaches of standard, new 
and post-Keynesian paradigms. 
18 This equation of dominant social interests and the dominance of economic paradigms (‘the 
mainstream’) that serve these interests is at the core of the socioeconomics of economics (cf. Heise 
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(cf. Kooths 2018) that science must unify around a consensus in the event of competing 
advice rather than leaving it to politicians to select whichever advice they deem ‘suitable’: 
for if consensus is supposed to mean ‘compromise’, this would always (assuming one of 
the initial proposals is correct) always result in incorrect policy advice, whereas if it 
means settling on the smallest common denominator, there would not be much ‘policy 
advice’ left over in most cases. Moreover, the reality of policy consulting shows that in 
many cases, such as the introduction of a minimum wage or the ‘debt brake’ in Germany 
or assessments of eurozone austerity, ‘consensus’ means the majority position of the 
mainstream, which is ‘constantly bandied about with great fanfare’ so as to prevent the 
‘crazy nonsense’ of alternative positions from ‘becoming respectable’ (Potrafke 2017: 
20; own translation). Dullien and Horn (2018: 930) refute the notion that the correctness 
or quality of scientific findings and the advice derived from them is a matter of majorities 
within the scholarly profession, but it is perhaps more significant that precisely this 
‘arrogance of the majority’ can (and generally does) result in ideological distortion if 
recommendations are made despite there being empirical evidence that flatly contradicts 
them (e.g. rejecting the minimum wage on the basis that it would cause mass job losses 
despite a demonstrable lack of empirical support for this view; see Heise 2019a) or at 
least widespread scientific dissent and uncertain empirical evidence (as in the case of the 
‘debt brake’ and the effects of austerity), without explicit attention being drawn to the 
controversial nature and restricted theoretical foundations of these recommendations (e.g. 
the fact that they are based on a ‘neoclassical model’). 
Policy consulting is thus not necessarily at risk of being ideological, at least not if a 
plurality of advice is ensured by means of pluralist scientific principles and this plurality 
is actively promoted through transparency about the paradigmatic allegiances of the 
consultants.19 The inability of policy consulting to meet these exacting demands is 
without a doubt the fault of the state that sets the framework and the individual scholars 
that promulgate ideologies, but only of the discipline of economics as a whole (that is, 
the scientific community) insofar as it is unable to ensure the necessary paradigm 
pluralism. 
8. Conclusion 
This article has discussed the relationship between economics and ideology: is economics 
an ideology-free method of scientific analysis for obtaining objective knowledge, or is it 
a vehicle of the dominant ideology, or, as Joan Robinson suggested, both at once? The 
latter option would only be possible if science is attributed a socially formative power 
                                                          
2016, Heise 2019b, Heise and Thieme 2017). 
19 The aforementioned requirement in Article 2 of the German Act on the Appointment of a Council 
of Experts on Economic Development can be understood in this sense. The same principle was also 
behind the German Minimum Wage Commission’s decision to commission separate reports on the 
macroeconomic consequences of the minimum wage from Keynesian and neoclassical perspectives; 
cf. Braun et al. (2017); Herr et al. (2017). 
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and ‘ideology’ is meant in the positively connoted sense of a social vision.20 But if 
‘ideology’ means a distortion of reality in the service of certain interests, it is hard to see 
how economics could be both at once. 
However, we have shown that a social science such as economics, particularly if it 
chooses to understand itself as a positivist science, must necessarily be practised 
pluralistically, in the sense that multiple paradigms can compete with another over the 
best interpretation of reality provided that they meet certain methodological standards. 
This implies that even ‘less good’ or false interpretations of reality (i.e. interpretations 
based on false pre-analytic visions) can satisfy the aspiration of scientific analysis if or 
insofar as they are not clearly falsified by empirical evidence or logical fallacies. 
However, in order for the relativity of the acquired knowledge not to become ideological 
distortion, it is necessary that the pluralist imperative be recognised and that there is 
transparency about the paradigmatic basis of the findings. And it is precisely here that the 
difference between the fundamental principles of economics and the actual practice of a 
science by the corresponding scientific community can be seen: if a single monistic 
paradigm marginalises other competing paradigms and its scientific views and the 
economic policy recommendations derived from them are ‘constantly banded about with 
great fanfare’ (Potrafke 2017: 20; own translation), alternative ideas are rejected as ‘crazy 
nonsense’ and the theoretical principles underlying this paradigm are not taught in 
universities, this must be considered ideological distortion. 
The accusation of ideology is sometimes levelled at economics a little overhastily, when 
its findings do not agree with the views (or prejudices) of the accuser or a cui bono 
investigation reveals that people who are materially better off will benefit from the 
economic policy recommendations derived from it.21 Formal, axiomatic modelling may 
also be unsuited to understanding social processes – though economists at least (across 
all paradigmatic divisions), with their positivist self-conception, take a different view (cf. 
Badinger, Oberhofer and Cuaresma 2017) – and necessarily requires ungrounded ‘value 
judgements’ to be made when selecting the core assumptions (axioms in which the posited 
ontology is contained). However, this only represents an ideological distortion in the 
negative sense if a specific model (in this case, the dynamic stochastic equilibrium model 
that constitutes the contemporary mainstream) claims general validity and rejects all 
alternative paradigms as ‘nonsense’ or, under the sway of a ‘thought compulsion’, simply 
ignores realities that contradict theoretical conclusions.22 
                                                          
20 It must be noted here that Joan Robinson did not clearly distinguish between positive and negative 
concepts of ideology, and so her claim that economics is both a vehicle of ideology and a scientific 
method may be attributable to an insistence on the rationality of visions. 
21 Schulmeister (2019: 86) appears to be insinuating this when he writes that mainstream economic 
theories ‘are guided by common ideological principles. This is readily evident from the “fruits” of 
these theories, that is, their recommendations and the consequences of these recommendations, but 
not so readily from their theoretical constructs. The simplest test is, as ever: whom do the theories 
benefit?’  
22 It follows from the logic of the argument presented here that the accusation of ideology thus 
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There is little doubt that the current state of economics, and not just in Germany, must be 
described precisely in these terms: research, teaching and policy consulting are, by and 
large, based monistically on the DSGE paradigm, even if variations within this paradigm 
(extensions of the Denkstil) are tolerated, especially in research, while alternative 
paradigms are systematically marginalised.23 A science whose community24 is unable to 
ensure that its discipline is practised in a proper (i.e. pluralist) manner must accept the 
charge of ideology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
formulated does not necessarily mean that the incriminated paradigm must in fact be postulating 
untruths in favour of specific interests. Only a paradigm that lays claim to sole and objective truth is 
ideological in this sense.  
23 ‘Systematically’ means that it is not simply that more successful scientific networks prevail (for 
example, as a result of appointment cartels and close-knit networks between research institutions and 
funding bodies) but that institutional incentive structures are created (for instance, by introducing 
appointment criteria and ‘performance-based’ funding that is awarded according to seemingly 
objective criteria such as impact-based hierarchies of publications) that privilege the mainstream.  
24 With regards to the fundamental right of academic freedom, the state’s role as regulator must also 
be mentioned here. ‘Academic freedom’ is typically understood as a negative norm that prevents 
unjustified interventions (especially by the state) in the practice of academic activities. But it can also 
be understood as a positive, constitutive norm that requires the state to ensure or facilitate proper 
conduct of academic inquiry. 
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